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Abstract
Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot co-
ordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and
coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explana-
tory power of models with multiple equilibria it is rst necessary to understand how an
economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper, we employ notions of learn-
ability, self-enforceability, and properness to motivate and develop a suite of equilibrium
selection criteria. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable
by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use
two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to
multiple equilibria and to illustrate our equilibrium selection methods. Importantly, un-
less the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we nd little reason to
expect coordination on that equilibrium.
Keywords: Discretionary policymaking, multiple equilibria, coordination, equilibrium
selection.
JEL Classication: E52, E61, C62, C73.
We would like to thank seminar participants at the University of Exeter, the Australian National Univer-
sity, the University of New South Wales, and Monash University, and participants at the 2010 Computing in
Economics and Finance Conference for comments. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reect
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
yAddress for Correspondence: Economic Research, Mail Stop 1130, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
101 Market St, CA 94105, USA. Email: richard.dennis@sf.frb.org.
1 Introduction
Discretionary policymakers can fall foul of expectations traps and coordination failures. When
private agents are forward-looking their expectations, shaped by anticipations about future
policy, can inuence importantly how policy today is conducted. The discretionary policy-
makers Achilles heel is that when formulating policy it is unable to manage private sector
expectations, and this inability, although essential for time-consistent policymaking, leaves
ajar the door to multiple equilibria. When expectations cannot be managed, private agents
can form expectations that, although unwelcome from the policymakers perspective, lead pri-
vate agents to react in a manner that traps the policymaker into implementing a policy that
validates those expectations. The trap is closed when a policy that renders those unwelcome
expectations without foundation is more costly and hence less attractive to the discretionary
policymaker than a policy that accommodates them.
The fact that multiple equilibria produced by the policymakers inability to manage pri-
vate sector expectations can beset discretionary control problems is troublesome, yet hugely
important. Troublesome, because e¤orts to solve or mitigate the time-consistency problem
associated with optimal policymaking rely invariably on there being a unique discretionary
equilibrium. A Rogo¤-style (Rogo¤, 1985) approach of delegating objectives to a discre-
tionary policymaker (as per Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003), among others) is unlikely to
be successful unless it also solves the coordination problem. Similarly, to the extent that
an optimal contract (Walsh, 1995) can successfully overcome the time-consistency problem, it
too should address the coordination problem. Important, because it means that discretionary
policy behavior can be considerably richer and more varied than is commonly appreciated,
with switches among equilibria becoming a potential source of economic volatility. Moreover,
because the mechanisms that produce multiple equilibria involve the strategic interactions be-
tween agents over time, they are not precluded by linear constraints and quadratic objectives.
As a consequence, much research analyzing discretionary policymaking since Kydland and
Prescott (1977) may have inadvertently considered only one of several equilibria, potentially
overlooking essential aspects of discretionary policy behavior.
It is not unusual for economies to transition between periods of high and low ination,
a phenomenon that expectations traps have the potential to explain (Albanesi, Chari, and
Christiano, 2003). Similarly, transitions from one equilibrium to another o¤ers an explanation
for policy regime changes, like those analyzed by Davig and Leeper (2006). Accordingly, an
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explanation for the change in U. S. ination behavior between the 1970s and the 1980s could
be that Volckers appointment to Federal Reserve Chairman served to coordinate expectations
and behavior, switching the economy from one discretionary equilibrium to another. However,
in order to utilize the explanatory power of multiple equilibria it is necessary to rst consider
how an economy arrives at a particular equilibrium. In the words of Benhabib and Farmer
(1999, pp. 438), in any model with multiple equilibria one must address the issue of how an
equilibrium comes about.
In this paper, we study multiple equilibria in innite-horizon linear-quadratic discretionary
control problems. We describe the control problem facing the discretionary policymaker
and, drawing on Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Currie and Levine (1985, 1993), reinterpret
the control problem as a dynamic game between policymakers at di¤erent points in time.
An important aspect of this game is that within a period the policymaker is a (Stackelberg)
leader with respect to private agents. Feedback equilibria to the discretionary control problem
correspond to Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria to the dynamic game. We show how
strategic interaction among current and future policymakers, operating through endogenous
state variables and private sector expectations, leads to a form of strategic complementarity
(Cooper and John, 1988) and makes expectations traps and coordination failures possible.
We approach the coordination problem inherent in equilibrium selection from three angles.
First, we consider eductive learning as a coordinating mechanism for equilibrium selection
(Evans, 1986), drawing on the large literature that employs learning to analyze coordination
in rational expectations models (Guesnerie and Woodford, 1992; Evans and Guesnerie, 1993;
2003; 2005; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). With agents learning eductively, and allowing
private agents and/or the policymaker to be learning, we develop three expectational stabil-
ity conditions whose satisfaction determines whether private agents and/or the policymaker
might reasonably learn and coordinate on a particular equilibrium. Among these three sets
of stability conditions, we show that the key conditions are those indicating whether an equi-
librium is learnable by private agents in isolation and by private agents and the policymaker
jointly. Second, we consider whether the potential for non-cooperative coalitions to form
might e¤ectively rule out some equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987). Pursuing
this idea, we examine whether the Nash equilibria we obtain are self-enforceable. Third, we
consider whether the number and nature of the equilibria we nd is sensitive to perturbations
to the model. Specically, in the models that we analyze, we nd it plausible that private-
sector expectations of future aggregate ination might be formed using outdated information
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and implausible that agents could coordinate on equilibria whose existence does not survive
perturbations to this information set.
To illustrate equilibrium multiplicity and an approach to equilibrium selection, we analyze
two New Keynesian models. The rst model is a government-debt model adapted from
Leeper (1991) by Blake and Kirsanova (2007). The second model is a simplied version
of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). In each model, the task confronting the
policymaker is to stabilize ination without impacting unduly the real economy. Ination, in
these models, is determined by the expected path of real marginal costs, so the policy challenge
is to generate an appropriate path for real marginal costs. Since ination depends on the
entire expected path for real marginal costs while the discretionary policymaker can choose
only todays policy, the policy chosen today depends necessarily on expected future policy. At
the same time, the decisions that future policymakers make depend materially on the economic
circumstances that they nd themselves in, and hence on the choices previous policymakers
have made. This interaction between policymakers over time produces coordination failure
and leads to multiple equilibria.
Our research is related to several other papers. King and Wolman (2004) show that mul-
tiple discretionary equilibria can arise in a New Keynesian policy model if there is strategic-
complementarity in rmspricing. In their model, non-linearities cause there to be multiple
point-in-time equilibria and the strategic complementarity introduces a coordination prob-
lem.1 Unlike King and Wolman (2004), the multiplicity that we analyze does not require
non-linearity. Our paper is also related to Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003), who show
that a modied version of the Lucas and Stokey (1983) cash-credit model can have multiple
discretionary equilibria when some rms have sticky prices, and to Ortigueira and Pereira
(2009), who analyze time-consistent policymaking when the Stackelberg player is a scal au-
thority and also nd multiple discretionary equilibria. Finally, our paper builds on Blake and
Kirsanova (2007), who rst showed the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria in the
linear-quadratic context.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the linear-
quadratic discretionary control problem, provide a game theoretic interpretation, dene a
1 Interestingly, Dotsey and Hornstein (2008) and van Zandweghe and Wolman (2010) show that the multiplic-
ity highlighted by King and Wolman (2004) does not emerge if the policy instrument is the nominal instrument,
rather than nominal money balances, or if price rigidity is modeled in terms of Calvo-contracts, rather than
two-period Taylor-contracts, respectively.
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symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, and show how such equilibria can be
obtained. In Section 3, we outline how expectational stability criteria associated with eductive
learning, notions of non-cooperative coalitions, and model perturbation can be used to select
among multiple equilibria. In Section 4, we analyze two New Keynesian policy models, show
that they each possess multiple equilibria, and illustrate how the selection criteria can be
employed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The discretionary control problem
In this section, we outline the control problem facing a discretionary policymaker. We then
reinterpret this control problem as a non-cooperative dynamic game and show that the stan-
dard optimal discretionary policy is a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of a dy-
namic game in which the policymaker is a Stackelberg leader and private agents are follow-
ers. To make explicit the games leadership structure, we call this equilibrium a symmetric
Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that solving for a symmet-
ric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in this game requires solving a particular
x-point problem.
2.1 Constraints and objectives
The economic environment is one in which n1 predetermined variables, xt, and n2 nonprede-
termined variables, yt, t = 0; 1; :::;1, evolve over time according to
xt+1 = A11xt +A12yt +B1ut + vxt+1; (1)
Etyt+1 = A21xt +A22yt +B2ut; (2)
where ut is a p1 vector of control variables, vxt  i:i:d: [0;] is an v1 (1  v  n1) vector
of white-noise innovations, and Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon
period t information. Equations (1) and (2) capture aggregate constraints and technologies
and the behavior (aggregate rst-order conditions) of private agents. For their part, private
agents are comprised of households and rms who are ex ante identical, respectively, innitely
lived, and atomistic. The matrices A11, A12, A21, A22, B1, and B2 are conformable with xt,
yt, and ut as necessary and contain the parameters that govern preferences and technologies.
Importantly, the matrix A22 is assumed to have full rank.
In addition to private agents, the economy is populated by a large player, a policymaker.
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For each period t, the period-t policymakers objectives are described by the loss function
Lt = Et
1X
k=t
(k t)
h
z
0
kWzk + 2z
0
kUuk + u
0
kQuk
i
; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and zk =

x
0
k y
0
k
0
. We assume that the weighting
matrices W and Q are symmetric and, to ensure that the loss function is convex, that the
matrix

W U
U
0
Q

is positive semi-denite.2 We assume that the policymaker is a Stackelberg
leader and that private agents are followers; we further assume that the policymaker does not
have access to a commitment technology and that policy is conducted under discretion.3 With
policy conducted under discretion, the policymaker sets its control variables, ut, each period
to minimize equation (3), taking the state, xt, and the decision rules of all future agents as
given. Since the policymaker is a Stackelberg leader, the period-t policy decision is formulated
taking equation (2) as well as equation (1) into account.
The control problem described above has many of the characteristics of an innite horizon
non-cooperative dynamic game, and is commonly viewed as such. Following Oudiz and Sachs
(1985), Currie and Levine (1985), and Cohen and Michel (1988), the strategic players in the
game are the (innite) sequence of policymakers with private agents behaving competitively.
Although individual private agents are not strategic players in aggregate they are not incon-
sequential. Private agents are important because private-sector expectations are the conduit
through which strategic interaction between current and future policymakers occurs. In this
decision problem, policy behavior is described by a policy strategy, private-agent behavior is
described by a private sector strategy, the expectations operator (Et) and policy loss (payo¤)
are induced by the policy and private sector strategies, and the equilibrium that we seek to
analyze is a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Some useful denitions and equilibrium concepts
In the previous section we emphasized that the discretionary control problem can be modeled
as a non-cooperative dynamic game, with the decisions of the policymaker and of private agents
2 It is standard to assume that the weighting matrices, W and Q, are symmetric positive semi-denite
and symmetric positive denite, respectively (see Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996), for
example). However, since many economic applications involve a loss function that places no penalty on the
control variables, we note that the requirement of Q being positive denite can be weakened to Q being positive
semi-denite if additional assumptions about other system matrices are met (Clements and Wimmer, 2003).
3Events within a period occur as follows. After observing the state, xt, decisions are made rst by the
incumbent policymaker and subsequently by private agents. At the end of the period the shocks vxt+1 are
realized.
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taking the form of strategies. Further, we noted that because the policymaker is assumed to
be a Stackelberg leader the discretionary equilibrium that we are interested in is a symmetric
Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. We now make these terms precise.4
Denition 1 A policy strategy S is a sequence of policy rules fFtg10 , where Ft is a function
that maps fxtgt0 to ut. A policy strategy is said to be a Markov policy strategy if and only if
each policy rule Ft is a function that maps xt to ut. We denote by S t the sequence of policy
rules fFsg10 excluding Ft.
Denition 2 A private sector strategy T is a sequence of decision rules fHtg10 , where Ht is
a function that maps fxtgt0 to yt. A private sector strategy is said to be a Markov private
sector strategy if and only if each decision rule Ht is a function that maps xt to yt. We
denote by T t the sequence of decision rules fHsg10 excluding Ht.
Denition 3 A policy strategy S is a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium if for every decision period
t: i) Ft minimizes equation (3) subject to equations (1) and (2) and xt known, taking S t and
T t as given; and ii) Ht satises equations (1) and (2), taking S and T t, as given.
Denition 4 A policy strategy S is a perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium if for every decision
period t and any history fFs;Hsgt 10 : i) Ft minimizes equation (3) subject to equations (1)
and (2) and xt known, taking S t and T t as given; and ii) Ht satises equations (1) and
(2), taking S and T t as given.
A perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is time-consistent because it is subgame perfect.
However, the strategies that characterize equilibrium are not necessarily Markov strategies
and, as a consequence, trigger-strategy equilibria, and other equilibria supported by threats
and punishments are not ruled out. The sustainable equilibria studied by Chari and Kehoe
(1990), Ireland (1997), and Kurozumi (2008) as well as the reputationalequilibria examined
by Barro and Gordon (1983) are all examples of perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria.
Denition 5 A policy strategy S is a Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium if restrict-
ing S to be a Markov policy strategy and T to be a Markov private sector strategy, for every
4Although the discretionary control problem described in section 2.1 is standard in the monetary policy
literature (it is the formulation used by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), for example) there are other notions
of discretion in the literature. These di¤erent notions of discretion are associated either with di¤erent dynamic
games or with di¤erent equilibrium concepts. Cohen and Michel (1988), de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991),
and Chow (1997, chapter 6) provide useful discussions.
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time period t and any history of Markov policy and decision rules fFs;Hsgt 10 : i) Ft minimizes
equation (3) subject to equations (1) and (2) and xt known, taking S t and T t as given; and
ii) Ht satises equations (1) and (2), taking S and T t as given.
Denition 6 A policy strategy S is a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium
if and only if: i) S is a Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in which Ft = F; 8 t;
and ii) T is a Markov private sector strategy in which Ht = H; 8 t.
2.3 Characterizing equilibrium
For the decision problem summarized by equations (1) (3), we now describe the equilib-
rium conditions that characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium,
focusing on equilibria for which the decision rules are linear in the state vector.
First, if a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium exists, then in this
equilibrium the behavior of the policymaker and private agents in all states, xt, and in all
decision periods, t = 0; :::;1, is described by the linear rules
ut = Fxt; (4)
yt = Hxt; (5)
respectively. In this equilibrium, the law-of-motion for the predetermined variables is given
by
xt+1 = Mxt + vxt+1;
where the spectral radius of M is less than  
1
2 . Further, since the loss function is quadratic
and the constraints are linear, the payo¤ to the policymaker in period t that corresponds to
these rules is summarized by the quadratic state-contingent value function
V (xt) = x
0
tVxt + d;
where V is symmetric positive semi-denite. Importantly, because the policy rule, F, and
the decision rule, H, in a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium apply in
all states, the subgames one needs to consider when solving for a symmetric Markov-perfect
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium are those indexed only by time.
Second, if a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium exists for the subgame
beginning in period t+1, then one can condition the subgame beginning in period t on the H,
F, M, V, and d that characterize the equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period t + 1.
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Thus, the decision problem facing the policymaker in the subgame beginning in period t is to
choose a rule for setting ut in order to minimize
x
0
tVxt + d = x
0
tW11xt + x
0
tW12yt + y
0
tW21xt + y
0
tW22yt + 2x
0
tU1ut + 2y
0
tU2ut + u
0
tQut
+Et

x
0
t+1Vxt+1 + d

; (6)
subject to equations (1) and (2) and
ut+1 = Fxt+1; (7)
yt+1 = Hxt+1; (8)
and xt known. Importantly, although H and V are functions of F, the problems structure
means that F does not have a separate, explicit, e¤ect on the current period payo¤, V (xt) =
x
0
tVxt + d. Consequently, as this decision problem is formulated, equation (7) does not bind
as a separate constraint.
Using equation (8) to form Etyt+1, substituting the resulting expression into equation (2),
and exploiting equation (1), we obtain the aggregate private-sector reaction function
yt = Jxt +Kut; (9)
where
J =
 
A22  HA12
 1  
HA11  A21

; (10)
K =
 
A22  HA12
 1  
HB1  B2

: (11)
Provided rank (K) 6= 0, equation (9) implies that the period-t policymaker is a Stackelberg
leader with respect to the period-t private sector. Then, substituting equation (9) into
equations (6) and (1), the decision problem facing the policymaker in the subgame beginning
in period t is to choose a rule for setting ut in order to minimize
x
0
tVxt + d = x
0
t
cWxt + 2x0t bUut + u0t bQut + Et x0t+1Vxt+1 + d ; (12)
subject to
xt+1 = bAxt + bBut + vxt+1; (13)
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where
cW = W11 +W12J+ J0W21 + J0W22J; (14)bU = W12K+ J0W22K+U1 + J0U2; (15)bQ = Q+K0W22K+ 2K0U2; (16)bA = A11 +A12J; (17)bB = B1 +A12K: (18)
Conditional on H and V (and F), equations (12) and (13) describe a standard linear-
quadratic dynamic programming problem. To guarantee existence of a solution, we needbA; bB to be a controllable pair and bA;cW to be a detectable pair (Laub, 1979; Anderson,
Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1996). Suppose that, for a given J and K,
bA; bB is a
controllable pair and
bA;cW is a detectable pair, then the solution to the subgame beginning
in period t has the form of rules (4) and (5), with
F =  
bQ+  bB0VbB 1 bU0 +  bB0V bA ; (19)
0 = HA12H A22H+H (A11 +B1F) A21  B2F; (20)
V = cW + 2bUF+ F0 bQF+ bA+ bBF0 V bA+ bBF ; (21)
d = tr (V) + d: (22)
From F and H, the matrix M in the law-of-motion for the predetermined variables is then
given by
M = A11 +A12H+B1F: (23)
Because H, F, M, V, and d represent a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash
equilibrium for the subgame beginning in period t+1, any x-point of equations (19) (23) in
which H = H, F = F, M = M, V = V, and d = d, such that V is symmetric positive semi-
denite and
bQ+  bB0VbB has full rank, is a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash
equilibrium for the subgame beginning in period t.
Although an array of root-solving methods could be used to solve equations (19) (23),
economic applications invariably employ either the Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) or the (closely
related) Oudiz and Sachs (1985) methods, which are based on recursive iterations.
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2.4 Implementability
Having described the x-point problem that a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash
equilibrium must satisfy, here we address the issue of whether an equilibrium can be imple-
mented. Implementability is important because it relates whether an equilibrium can be
brought about if policymakers pursue its associated policy strategy. Consistent with Dotsey
and Hornstein (2008),
Denition 7 Let eA =  A11 +B1F A12
A21 +B2F A22

. A symmetric Markov-Perfect Stackelberg-
Nash equilibrium is said to be implementable, or, equivalently, a policy strategy, S, is said to
implement a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, if: i)

I  eA z = 0
implies z = 0; ii) (HA12  A22) has full rank; and iii) eA has precisely n2 eigenvalues with
modulus greater than 1.
Collectively these three conditions say that if a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-
Nash equilibrium to be implementable, then, when policy is conducted according to its as-
sociated strategy, S, the model described by equations (1) and (2) must have: i) a unique
steady state; ii) a unique point-in-time equilibrium; and iii) a unique rational expectations
equilibrium.
It is frequently the case that a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is
not implementable even when it is unique for a model because the (Markov) policy strategy
does not imply a unique rational expectations equilibrium. However, if a model happens to
have one or more equilibria that is implementable, then these equilibria are notable because
they can be brought to prevail if policymakers conduct policy according to their associated
policy strategy, S.
3 Equilibrium selection
Although we recognize that in many instances all equilibria may be of interest, because it
strengthens a models predictive content it is often desirable and advantageous to identify
a single equilibrium (or a smaller set of equilibria) of interest, especially if one equilibrium
stands out as a likely candidate for coordination. For example, as we shall see, although a
model may have multiple equilibria, if the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is implementable, then
one could reasonably expect the Pareto-preferred equilibrium to prevail. In this section, we
introduce and discuss criteria that can be applied to reduce the set of equilibria and to possibly
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identify a unique equilibrium of interest. Specically, we focus on three coordination/selection
mechanisms: expectational stability (Evans, 1986), self-enforceability (Bernheim, Peleg, and
Whinston, 1987), and properness (Myerson, 1978).
3.1 Eductive learning and expectational stability
Evans (1986) motivates expectational stability as a selection criterion in rational expectations
models with multiple equilibria. Loosely speaking, a rational expectations equilibrium is
expectationally stable if, following small deviations to the expectation formation process, the
system returns to that equilibrium under a natural revision rule. The relevant revision
rule emerges naturally from the thought process whereby agents undertake to revise how they
form expectations based on how those expectations would e¤ect the actual economy, seeking
to rationalize, or equate, a perceived law-of-motion with the actual law-of-motion. Although
the revisions occur in meta-time, there is a close connection between expectational stability
and real-time least-squares learnability of a rational expectations equilibrium (Marcet and
Sargent, 1989; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
Like Evans (1986) and Evans and Guesnerie (2003, 2005), we view learning as a mechanism
through which agents may coordinate on an equilibrium. Unlike these studies, however, the
models we analyze are populated by both private agents and a policymaker, one or both of
which may be learning. As a consequence, we analyze three learning problems and derive
three expectational stability related conditions. In each case, the learning that we entertain
is eductive in nature with agents revising their behavior in meta-time based on the outcomes
of thought experiments. The notion of stability under learning that we consider is iterative
expectational stability (IE-stability).5
Recall that a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is characterized by
fH;F;M;V; dg. Because M and d follow immediately and uniquely from F, H, and V,
we implement the partitioning ffH;F;Vg ; fM; dgg and focus on fH;F;Vg in what follows.
Specically, we consider:
1. Private sector learning, where we analyze whether private agents can learnH, conditional
on fF;Vg.
2. Policymaker learning, where we analyze whether the policymaker can learn fF;Vg,
conditional on fHg.
5See Evans (2001) for a very useful discussion of adaptive versus eductive learning and of expectational
stability (E-stability) versus iterative expectational stability (IE-stability).
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3. Joint learning, where we analyze whether private agents and the policymaker can learn
fH;F;Vg jointly.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
To place the three learning problems in a unied framework, let us denote by  the object(s)
to be learned. Thus, in the case where only private agents are learning  = fHg. Then, to
determine whether is learnable we construct and analyze the T-map that relates a perception
of , denoted , to an actual ,  = T
 


.
Denition 8 A x-point, , of the T-map,  = T
 


, is said to be IE-stable if
lim
k"1
T k
 


= ,
for all  6= .
It follows that  is IE-stable if and only if it is a stable x-point of the di¤erence equation
k+1 = T (k) ; (24)
where index k denotes the step of the updating process. Similarly,
Denition 9 A x-point, , of the T-map,  = T
 


, is said to be locally IE-stable if
lim
k"1
T k
 


= ,
for all  about a neighborhood of .
Let the derivative of the T-map be denoted DT (), then it is straightforward to prove
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that the derivative map, DT (), has no eigenvalues with modulus equal
to 1. A x-point, , of the T-map,  = T
 


, is locally IE-stable if and only if all
eigenvalues of the derivative map, DT (), have modulus less than 1.
Proof. Following Evans (1985), to analyze the local stability of equation (24) we linearize the
equation about . Using matrix calculus results from Magnus and Neudecker (1988, chapter
9) we obtain
d (vec (k+1)) = DT (
) d (vec (k))
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where DT () = @ (vec (T ())) =@ (vec ())0. Applying standard results for linear di¤er-
ence equations, if all of the eigenvalues of DT () have modulus less than one, then  is
locally stable. In contrast, if one or more of the eigenvalues of DT () have modulus greater
than one, then  is not locally stable.
3.1.2 Eductive learning by private agents
We begin with the case in which only private agents are learning and examine whether private
agents can learn H, given fF;Vg. For a given policy rule, ut = Fxt, and a postulated private
sector decision rule
yt = Hxt;
the actual private sector decision rule takes the form
yt = Hxt;
where
H =
 
HA12  A22
 1 
A21 +B2F H (A11 +B1F)

: (25)
Equation (25) describes the T-map, T (H), fromH toH; it is, of course, equivalent to equation
(20).
Lemma 2 A symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is locally IE-stable un-
der private sector learning if and only if all eigenvalues of
  [I
 (HA12  A22)] 1
h
(A11+A12H+B1F)
0 
 I
i
have modulus less than 1.
Proof. Applying standard matrix calculus rules to equation (25), the total di¤erential can be
written as
(HA12  A22) d (H) + d
 
H

A12H+ d
 
H

(A11 +B1F) = 0;
which after vectorizing can be rearranged to give
vec [d (H)] =   [I
 (HA12  A22)] 1
h
(A11+A12H+B1F)
0 
 I
i
vec

d
 
H

:
We apply Lemma 1 to obtain the required result. Note that invertability of (HA12  A22) is
virtually ensured by the assumption that A22 has full rank.
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Because the eigenvalues of M = A11+A12H+B1F are all strictly less than  
1
2 , equilibria
that are not locally IE-stable under private sector learning are those for which (HA12  A22)
is close to equaling the null matrix.
In addition, there is an important connection between implementability of an equilibrium
and whether an equilibrium is IE-stable under private sector learning.
Lemma 3 If a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is implementable, then
it is locally IE-stable under private sector learning.
Proof. See McCallum (2007).
3.1.3 Eductive learning by the leader
We now turn to the case where the policymaker is learning, but private agents are not. Here
we examine whether the policymaker can learn fF;Vg, given fHg. We show that although
learning by policymakers is interesting and important in many contexts, here this local IE-
stability criterion cannot discriminate among equilibria.
For a given private sector decision rule, yt = Hxt, and a postulated policy rule
ut = Fxt;
and a postulated value function matrix V, the T-map T (F;V), from

F;V
	
to fF;Vg is
described by the following updating relationships
F =  
bQ+  bB0VbB 1 bU0 +  bB0V bA ; (26)
V = cW + 2bUF+ F0 bQF+ bA+ bBF0 V bA+ bBF ; (27)
where cW, bU, bQ, bA, and bB are dened by equations (14) (18) and do not depend on F or V
(or on F or V). Notice, that F, given H, is uniquely determined by V, so the key to learning
F is to learn V. As a consequence, without loss of generality we can substitute equation
(26) into equation (27) and analyze the the learning problem using the concentrated T-map
T (V) = V.
Lemma 4 All symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria are locally IE-stable un-
der policymaker learning.
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Proof. Applying standard matrix calculus rules to equations (26) and (27), total di¤erentials
are given by bQ+  bB0VbB d (F) +  bB0d  V bA+ bBF = 0; (28)
2
 bU+ F0 bQ+  bA+ bBF0 VbB d (F) +  bA+ bBF0 d  V bA+ bBF = Id (V) ;(29)
Using equation (28) to solve for d (F) and substituting the resulting expression into equation
(29) yields, upon rearranging,


 2
bU+  bA0VBbQ+  bB0VbB 1 bB0   2F0 bB0 + bA+ bBF0 d  V bA+ bBF = Id (V) ;
which, given equation (26), collapses to

bA+ bBF0 d  V bA+ bBF = Id (V) : (30)
After vectorizing and recognizing that M = bA+ bBF, equation (30) can be written as
vec [d (V)] = 

M
0 
M0

vec

d
 
V

:
The matrix 

M
0 
M0

denes the derivative map DT (V). Applying Lemma 1, a sym-
metric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria fH;F;M;V; dg is a local IE-stable policy
equilibrium if and only if all of the eigenvalues of DT (V) have modulus less than 1. Be-
cause the eigenvalues of M all have modulus less than  
1
2 in all symmetric Markov-perfect
Stackelberg-Nash equilibria the result follows.
3.1.4 Joint eductive learning
Finally, we analyze the case in which both private agents and the policymaker are learning.
The postulated policy and decision rules are
yt = Hxt;
ut = Fxt;
and the postulated value function matrix is V. Then the actual policy and decision rules are
given by
H = J+KF; (31)
F =  
bQ+  bB0VbB 1 bU+  bB0V bA ; (32)
V = cW + 2bUF+ F0 bQF+  bA+ bBF0 V bA+ bBF ; (33)
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where
J =
 
A22  HA12
 1  
HA11  A21

; (34)
K =
 
A22  HA12
 1  
HB1  B2

; (35)
and cW, bU, bQ, bA, and bB are dened by equations (14) (18) and are functions of J and K:
Given equations (34) and (35), equations (31) (33) describe the T-map, T
 
H;F;V

,
from

H;F;V
	
, to fH;F;Vg.
Lemma 5 A symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is locally IE-stable un-
der joint learning if and only if all eigenvalues of the matrix P 1L in
vec [d (G)] = P 1 Lvec

d
 
G

;
where vec [d (G)] =
h
vec [d (H)]
0
vec [d (F)]
0
vec [d (V)]
0 i0
and P and L are characterized
below, have modulus less than 1.
Proof. Total di¤erentials of equations (31) (35) about the point fH;F;V;J;Kg are given
by
0 = d (J) + d (K)F+Kd (F)  d (H) ; (36)
0 = d
 
H
 bA  (A22  HA12) d (J) ; (37)
0 = d
 
H
 bB  (A22  HA12) d (K) ; (38)
0 =  bB0d  VM+ bQ+  bB0VbB d (F) + 2K0W22 +U02 +  bB0VA12 d (K)F
+

W12 + J
0
W22 +  bA0VA12 d (K) + K0W22 +U02 +  bB0VA12 d (J) ; (39)
0 = 2
bU+ F0 bQ+ M0VbB d (F) + 2W12 +H0W22 + F0U02 + M0VA12 d (J)
+2

W12 +H
0
W22 + F
0
U
0
2 + M
0
VA12

d (K)F+ M
0
d
 
V

M  d (V) : (40)
Now, using equations (37) and (38) to solve for d (J) and d (K), respectively, and substituting
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these expressions into equations (36), (39), and (40) produces
0 = Kd (F) + (A22  HA12) 1 d
 
H

M d (H) ; (41)
0 =  bB0d  VM+bQ+  bB0VbB d (F)
+

W12 + J
0
W22 +  bA0VA12 (A22  HA12) 1 d  H bB
+2

K
0
W22 +U
0
2 + 
bB0VA12 (A22  HA12) 1 d  H bBF
+

K
0
W22 +U
0
2 + 
bB0VA12 (A22  HA12) 1 d  H bA (42)
0 = 2
bU+ F0 bQ+ M0VbB d (F) + M0d  VM d (V)
+2

W12 +H
0
W22 + F
0
U
0
2 + M
0
VA12

(A22  HA12) 1 d
 
H

M; (43)
where, again, the invertability of (A22  HA12) is virtually ensured by the assumption that
A22 has full rank. By vectorizing and stacking equations (41) (43) they can be written in
the form
Pvec [d (G)] = Lvec

d
 
G

;
where
P =
2664
I  K 0
0  
bQ+  bB0VbB 0
0  2
bU+ F0 bQ+ M0VbB I
3775 ;
and L is dened implicitly by equations (41) (43). Because
bQ+  bB0VbB has full rank in
any symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, P too has full rank. The result
follows.
Lemma 6 The equilibrium identied by Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and all equilibria identied
by Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) are IE-stable under joint learning.
Proof. The iterative numerical schemes employed by the Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) and
Oudiz and Sachs (1985) solution methods coincide with the learning scheme described by
the T-map (31) (33). As a consequence, these numerical solution methods apply direct
numerical iterations on the non-linear T-map. If these numerical solution methods converge
to a x-point, then, by construction, the resulting equilibrium is IE-stable under joint learning.
Before leaving this section, we wish to emphasize that the IE-stability criteria associated
with private sector learning and joint learning, although connected, are distinct. Joint learn-
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ability of an equilibrium neither implies nor is implied by private sector learnability of that
equilibrium.
3.2 Self-enforceability
We now approach the coordination problem by asking whether an equilibrium is self-enforceable
(Bernheim, Peleg, andWhinston, 1987; Bernheim andWhinston, 1987), robust to the potential
formation of non-cooperative coalitions. Intuitively, policymakers can more easily coordinate
on an equilibrium if that equilibrium is self-enforceable, and no group of policymakers nds
it benecial to form a coalition and deviate from equilibrium play. Assume that the model
has N symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria. Because the economic envi-
ronment is one in which there is complete and perfect information, the existence and nature of
all N equilibria is known to all agents. Moreover, the N equilibria can (invariably) be welfare
ranked and, as a consequence, agents are not indi¤erent to which equilibrium prevails.
Treating the policy rules associated with the N equilibria as a set of policy actions, because
the equilibria are Nash, if policymakers in periods s = t + 1; :::;1 are expected to play Fj ,
j = 1; :::; N , then the period-t policymakers best response is to also play Fj . However,
although it is never benecial for the period-t policymaker to unilaterally deviate from Nash
play, the period-t policymaker can potentially benet from deviations that involve multiple
policymakers. With this in mind, we introduce the possibility that a small coalition of
policymakers could form that may deviate from the play prescribed in equilibrium j. The
coalitions that we envisage are motivated by the fact that policymakers have tenures spanning
multiple decision periods and, as a consequence, we model them in terms of sequential players.6
Let (pj + 1) represent the number of sequential players in a potential coalition and con-
sider the period-t policymakers best response where the predicted future play is given by
fFt+1i ; :::;Ft+pji ;Ft+pj+1j ;Ft+pj+2j ; :::g, j 6= i, with private agents in periods s = t; :::;1 re-
sponding according to their reaction function. In this scenario, during periods s = t + pj +
1; :::;1 the policy rule and private-sector decision rules are given by Fj and Hj , respectively.
However, during periods s = t; :::; t + pj the policy rule is given by Fi and private agents
respond according to their reaction function,
Hs =
 
Hs+1A12  A22
 1 
A21 +B2Fi  Hs+1 (A11 +B1Fi)

: (44)
6One might view the group of deviating policymakers to be small if it numbers less than a policymakers
average tenure. In the U. S., Federal Reserve chairmen are appointed to a four year term, but the average
tenure is somewhat longer. In the U. K., monetary policy committee members have three-year contracts that
overlap to prevent members from retiring simultaneously.
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Given equation (44), the law-of-motion for the state vector during periods s = t; :::; t+ pj is
Ms = A11 +A12H
s +B1Fi:
We know that if pj = 0, then the period-t policymakers best response is to play Fj .
However, as pj increases, the period-t policymakers best response can switch from Fj to Fi.
For each Fj , we calculate the number of periods of multilateral deviation pj required to switch
the period-t policymakers best response from Fj to Fi. Of course, although the period-t
policymakers best response may switch from Fj to Fi as pj increases, it need not. In fact,
whether the period-t policymakers best response switches from Fj to Fi as pj increases turns
on whether equilibrium i is Pareto-preferred to equilibrium j and on whether equilibrium i is
locally IE-stable under private sector learning.
Lemma 7 The period-t policymakers best response will switch from Fj to Fi in the limit as
pj " 1 if and only if equilibrium i is Pareto-preferred to equilibrium j and equilibrium i is
locally IE-stable under private sector learning.
Proof. Consider equation (44). If equilibrium i is locally IE-stable under private sector learn-
ing, then, Hs ! Hi in the limit as pj " 1, which implies Ms !Mi and Vs ! Vi. Because
equilibrium i Pareto-dominates equilibrium j, the period-t policymakers best response must
switch from Fj to Fi. On the contrary, if equilibrium i is not locally IE-stable under private
sector learning, then although Hs may converge to eH 6= Hi in the limit as pj " 1, becauseeH 6= Hi the period-t policymakers best response cannot be Fi.
An additional issue that we consider is whether coalition forming can generate a switch
from the prevailing equilibrium to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium and, if so, how large of a
coalition is required to generate such a switch. It follows from Lemma 6 that the Pareto-
preferred equilibrium must be locally IE-stable under private sector learning if such a switch
is to occur.
3.3 Properness
To analyze whether an equilibrium is proper in the spirit of Myerson (1978), we consider a
particular perturbation of the model and ask whether the equilibrium under consideration
is a solution to the perturbed model in the limit as the perturbation tends to zero. The
particular perturbation that we consider is to the information set that private agents use to
form expectations. Thus, we recast equation (2) as
(1  )Etyt+1 + Et 1yt+1 = A21xt +A22yt +B2ut; (45)
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where  2 [0; 1] represents the perturbation. When  = 1, private agents form expectations
using period t 1 information while when  = 0 (and the model is unperturbed), private agents
form expectations using period t information. With the policy objective function continuing
to be given by equation (3), the -perturbed model is given by equations (1) and (45).
For this particular form of perturbation, equilibrium j; j = 1; :::; N , is considered -proper if
in the limit as  # 0 equilibrium j is a symmetric Markov-perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium
in the -perturbed model.
4 Applications
In this section we analyze two New Keynesian models that exhibit multiple symmetric Markov-
perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria. The rst is a version of the sticky price model with
government debt developed by Leeper (1991). The second is a sticky price New Keynesian
model in the spirit of Woodford (2003, Chapter 5) and Sveen and Weinke (2007), but with
partial ination indexation. This second model is especially notable because it resides at the
core of many New Keynesian models, such as those developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007)
4.1 A DSGE model with government debt
The economy is populated by a representative household, by a unit-continuum of monopolis-
tically competitive rms, and by a single large government that conducts separately monetary
policy and scal policy. Fiscal policy is conducted via a mechanistic rule that relates gov-
ernment spending, gt, inversely to the stock of real government debt, bt. Monetary policy,
in contrast, is conducted by choosing a setting for the nominal interest rate on a one-period
nominal bond, rt, optimally, but under discretion. Importantly, when formulating monetary
policy the central bank takes the scal rule into account. Monopolistically competitive rms
produce according to a production function that depends only on labor and these goods are
combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce aggregate output, yt, which is
allocated to either private consumption, ct, or government spending. Households choose their
consumption and leisure, 1  lt, and can transfer income through time through their holdings
of government bonds. The government issues debt period-by-period in order to pay the prin-
ciple and interest on its existing debt and to fund any discrepancy between its spending and
its tax revenues, yt, where  2 (0; 1) is the tax rate on income. Firms set prices subject to
a Calvo (1983) nominal price rigidity and aggregation across prices leads to a New Keynesian
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Phillips curve relating ination, t, to the expected future ination, real marginal costs, and
a serially correlated markup shock, vt.
When log-linearized about a zero-ination nonstochastic steady state the equations that
constrain the monetary policy decision problem can be written as
t = Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )
 ("+  )
( ct + yt) + vt;
ct = Etct+1    (rt   Ett+1) ;
yt = (1  ) gt + ct;
bt+1 = rt +
1

(bt   t + (1  ) gt   yt) ;
gt =  bt;
with the monetary policy objective function, a second-order accurate approximation7 to house-
hold utility, taking the form (Blake and Kirsanova, 2007)
Lt = (1  )Et
1X
k=t
(k t)

2k +
 (1  ) (1  )
(+  ) 

1
 
y2k +


c2k +
(1  )

g2k

:
The parameter , which reects the response of government spending to real debt, plays
a crucial role in the analysis. If the scal response parameter is relatively largethen scal
policy bears the burden of stabilizing the stock of debt and there is a unique symmetric Markov-
perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, following an adverse markup shock,
scal policy returns the real government debt quickly to its steady state level while monetary
policy stabilizes ination and output by raising the nominal interest rate in order to lower
real marginal costs. If the scal control is relatively small, then again there is a unique
equilibrium in which monetary policy bears the burden of stabilizing the stock of debt. In
the spirit of Leeper (1991), the former case can be thought of as one it which scal policy is
passive and monetary policy is active and the latter case as one in which scal policy is active
and monetary policy is passive. For an intermediatestrength of scal control, however, we
nd three equilibria.8
In Table 1, we report the policy rule, F, and the private-sector decision rules, H, for all
three equilibria.
7When deriving this approximation, Blake and Kirsanova (2007) assume the presence of an e¢ cient produc-
tion/employment subsidy, funded by a lump-sum tax, that o¤sets the output distortion caused by monopolistic
competition.
8We parameterize the model as follows. We set the discount factor, , to 0:99, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, , to 0:5, the consumption-output ratio, , to 0:75, the steady-state debt-to-output ratio, , to
0:1, the elasticity of substitution between goods, ", to 11, the Calvo price-rigidity, , to 0:75, the labor supply
elasticity,  , to 2, the income tax rate,  , to (1  )+ (1  ) and the scal policy parameter, , to 1:1. We
set the AR(1) coe¢ cient in the markup shock process to 0:3.
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Table 1: Policy rules in equilibrium
Eqm F =

Fv Fb

H =

Hcv Hcb
Hv Hb

A
  5:1657  0:8476   2:4392 0:9401
1:4385 0:0585

B

7:7386  0:2414    4:3044 0:4334
1:3073 0:0374

C

13:5114  0:1066    8:3962 0:2392
1:1339 0:0216

The three policy rules presented in Table 1 are qualitatively and quantitatively quite
di¤erent. Specically, monetary policy can be thought of as being passive in equilibrium A
and active in equilibria B and C.9 Thus, characterizing equilibrium A as passive, equilibrium
B as moderately active, and equilibrium C as active, Table 1 reveals a trade-o¤ between
the response to government debt and the response to the markup shock: the more active the
policy the more aggressively interest rates are raised in response to the markup shock.
To understand why multiple equilibria arise in this model, recognize that following a
markup shock the challenge facing the central bank is to bring ination down without creat-
ing too large of a recession. According to the Phillips curve, in any stationary equilibrium
ination depends on the entire expected future path of real marginal costs,
t = Et
1X
k=t
(k t)

(1  ) (1  )
 ("+  )
mck + vk

;
where real marginal costs are given by
mct =  ct + yt: (46)
Notice that when the discount factor, , is large mct and mct+1 are highly substitutable
in terms of their e¤ect on period-t ination. Clearly, if ination is above target, then there
are multiple paths for real marginal costs that will return ination to target. Each of these
paths for real marginal costs is associated with a di¤erent monetary policy and each has a
9To this point, consider the monetary policy rule in equilibrium A. It is useful to express this policy rule
as a relationship whereby the nominal interest rate responds to ination and real debt. When written in this
form the policy rule is
rt =  3:59103t   0:637409bt:
In contrast, the policy rule in equilibrium C is
rt = 11:9156t   0:363488bt:
In the spirit of Leeper (1991), the policy rule in equilibrium A can be thought of as being passive because it
suggests that the interest rate be lowered in response to a rise in ination.
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di¤erent cost in terms of loss. The policymaker might choose a policy that involves lower
future real marginal costs if that policy allows the costs of bringing ination back to target to
be deferred, even if that policy means tolerating slightly higher ination today.
Consider the case where future policymakers are expected to employ a policy rule that
responds only weakly to bt. In this case a monetary policy that seeks to counter the markup
shock by raising the real interest rate will be attractive. The higher real interest rate induces
households to defer consumption, which, from equation (46), achieves the goal of lowering
real marginal costs today and placing downward pressure on ination. Of course, the higher
interest rate also raises the cost of nancing the government debt, which together with the
fact that the decline in consumption lowers output and government tax revenues, leads to a
rise in bt. Where the success of this policy would be undone if future policymakers were to
cut interest rates aggressively in response to the rise in bt, because this would cause future
real marginal costs to rise, it is sustained on the expectation that future policymakers will not
attempt to solve the scal decit problem by stimulating the economy. This line of reasoning
gives rise to equilibrium C (or B).
In contrast, if future policymakers are expected to tighten monetary policy aggressively in
response to a decline in government debt, then a monetary policy that stimulates the economy
today can achieve lower ination over time, even if it permits higher ination today, provided
real marginal costs decline in the future. By lowering the interest rate in response to the
markup shock, monetary policy stimulates the economy and causes real marginal costs to rise,
which is inationary. However, because this policy raises government tax receipts and lowers
the cost of nancing debt, it causes the stock of government debt to decline. Since future
policymakers are expected to tighten monetary policy aggressively in response to a decline
in government debt, this policy achieves lower ination over time because it induces tighter
policy in the future. This line of reasoning gives rise to equilibrium A.
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Figure 1: Responses to unit markup shock
The economys behavior in each equilibria can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the re-
sponses of key variables to a unit markup shock. Focusing rst on the active and moderately
active equilibria (equilibria C and B, respectively), ination rises following the markup shock
(panel C) and the policy response is to raise the nominal interest rate (panel F). With the
nominal interest rate rising by more than ination, the real interest rate rises causing house-
holds to defer consumption (panel D). The decline in consumption lowers output (panel A)
and government tax revenues (panel H), which leads to a rise in government debt (panel
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B). In subsequent periods, although interest rates are lowered to stimulate the economy and
bring it out of recession, government debt is brought back to baseline predominantly through
(primary) scal surpluses, rather than through a decline in the cost of nancing government
debt.
In the passive equilibrium (equilibrium A), monetary policy responds to the markup shock
by lowering the interest rate, which stimulates consumption and output, raises real marginal
costs, and causes ination to rise by more than it otherwise would. This monetary policy
causes tax revenues to rise and leads to a decline in government debt. To stabilize gov-
ernment debt, future policymakers raise the cost of nancing government debt, which causes
consumption, output, and real marginal costs to decline and places downward pressure on
ination.
It is clear from Figure 1 that monetary policy and the economys behavior more generally
is very di¤erent in equilibrium A than it is in either equilibrium B or equilibrium C. With
these di¤erences in mind, we now apply the equilibrium selection methods described in Section
3 and report the results in Table 2. To determine whether the equilibria are -proper, we
perturb the model in respect to the information set that private agents use to form expected
future aggregate ination, and replace all instances of Ett+1 in the model with10
(1  )Ett+1 + Et 1t+1: (47)
Table 2 also identies the equilibria that can be obtained via the iterative Backus and Dri¢ ll
(1986) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985) solution procedures and shows the average loss associated
with each equilibrium.
Table 2: Equilibrium characteristics
Equilibrium
Characteristic A B C
(1) Average loss 2:2252 1:9935 1:6700
(2) IE-stable (Joint) yes no yes
(3) IE-stable (Private sector) yes yes yes
(4) Self-enforceable no no yes
(5) Switch to Pareto-preferred (pj + 1) 6 4 
(6) -proper no no yes
(7) Policy rule implementable no no no
(8) Backus-Dri¢ ll yes no yes
(9) Oudiz-Sachs no no yes
10This perturbation is a special case of the slightly more general perturbation represented by equation (45).
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The rst row of Table 2 reports the average loss associated with each equilibrium. This row
shows that the three equilibria can be welfare ranked and that equilibrium C, the equilibrium in
which monetary policy is most active in stabilizing output and ination, is the Pareto-preferred
equilibrium. In contrast, equilibrium A, in which monetary policy seeks to stabilize output
and ination by manipulating government debt, performs worst. Clearly, if policymakers and
private agents could coordinate, they would prefer to coordinate on equilibrium C.
Interestingly, the results in Table 2 show that the selection criteria do identify and select
equilibrium C. Unlike equilibrium A, equilibrium C is self-enforceable and -proper. Moreover,
unlike equilibrium B, equilibrium C is both jointly learnable and private-sector learnable. It
is notable, however, that the policy rule in equilibrium C is not implementable, which means
that by pursuing the policy associated with equilibrium C policymakers cannot ensure that the
Pareto-preferred equilibria prevails. Instead, the selection criteria suggest that coordination
on the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is likely to occur because it be learnable by private agents
and consequently self-enforceable.
4.2 A DSGE model with capital
Following Woodford (2003, Chapter 5), the economy is populated by households, intermediate-
good producing rms, nal-good producing rms, and a central bank. Households are iden-
tical and innitely lived, choosing consumption, ct, labor, lt, and nominal holdings of next
period bonds, bt+1, to maximize expected discounted utility subject to a budget constraint.
On the production side, a unit-continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate-good
producing rms, indexed by ! 2 [0; 1], produce by combining labor services hired in a per-
fectly competitive market with their rm-specic capital. These intermediate-good producing
rms make labor and investment decisions, seeking to maximize their value subject to their
production technology
Yt (!) = e
utKt (!)
 Lt (!)
(1 ) ;
their capital accumulation equation
It (!) = I

Kt+1 (!)
Kt (!)

Kt (!) ;
where I(1) = , I
0
(1) = 1, and I
00
(1) = , and a Calvo (1983) price rigidity, where rms
that cannot optimally set their price in a given period are assumed to index their price to
lagged aggregate ination (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Prots are aggregated and returned
to households (shareholders) in the form of a lump-sum dividend. The nal-good producing
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rms purchase intermediate goods, aggregate them into a nal good according to a Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) production technology, and sell these nal goods in a perfectly competitive
market to households and rms to consume and invest, respectively.
After aggregating and log-linearizing about a zero-ination nonstochastic steady state, the
models constraints and rst-order conditions are
t =

1 + 
t 1 +

1 + 
Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )
(1 + ) 
mct + vt;
ct = Etct+1   1

(rt   Ett+1   gt + Etgt+1) ;
kt+1 =
1
1 + 
kt +

1 + 
Etkt+2 +
1   (1  )
(1 + ) 
Etmst+1   1
(1 + ) 
(rt   Ett+1)
mct = wt   yt + lt;
wt = lt + ct   gt;
yt = (1  ) ct + 

[kt+1   (1  ) kt] ;
yt = ut + kt + (1  ) lt;
mst = wt   kt + lt
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,   1  is the discount rate,   + " 1" is the
steady-state share of investment in output, " > 1 is the steady-state elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods,  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate, and  > 0 is the elasticity of the
investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobins q evaluated at steady state (Eichenbaum
and Fisher, 2007).
Although the model allows for three stochastic elements: an aggregate consumption-
preference shock, gt; an aggregate markup shock, vt; and an aggregate technology shock,
ut, we zero-out gt and ut in order to focus on the policy trade-o¤s associated with the markup
shock, vt, which is assumed to evolve over time according to
vt+1 = vvt + vt+1;
where v 2 ( 1; 1) and vt+1 is i:i:d: distributed with zero mean and nite variance.11
The central banks loss function is assumed to have the form
Lt = (1  )Et
1X
k=t
(k t)

2k +
(1  ) (1  )
(1 + ) "
y2k

:
11To parameterize the model, we set the discount factor, , to 0:99, the Calvo price rigidity, , to 0:75, the
ination indexation parameter, , to 0:60, the Cobb-Douglas production function parameter, , to 0:36, the
capital adjustment costs parameter to 6:0, the labor supply elasticity, , to 1, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, , to 2, the depreciation rate, , to 0:025, the elasticity of subititution between goods, ", to 11,
and the shock persistece, v, to 0:3.
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With monetary policy conducted under discretion this model has three symmetric Markov-
perfect Stackelberg-Nash equilibria. The policy rule and the private-sector decision rules for
each equilibria are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Policy rules in equilibrium
Eqm F =

Fv Fk F

H =
24 Hv Hk HHcv Hck Hc
Hkv Hkk Hk
35
A
  7:0380 10:2219  1:2404 
24 2:4395  2:7992 0:62612:4479  4:5867 0:4119
0:6581  0:4265 0:1106
35
B

1:8248  0:0024 1:0199 
24 0:3319  0:1944 0:1075 1:5541 0:2006  0:5847
 0:4739 0:9302  0:1711
35
C

1:8651  0:0191 1:0340 
24 0:1683  0:0051 0:0673 1:6748 0:3302  0:6152
 0:5102 0:9696  0:1802
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To understand why this model has multiple equilibria we again turn to the Phillips curve
and to the problem of stabilizing ination. Adapting a result from Dennis and Söderström
(2006), the forward representation of the ination equation is given by
t = t 1 +
(1  ) (1  )

Et
1X
k=t
(k t)mck +
1 + 
1  v
vt: (48)
Moreover, real marginal costs can be expressed as
mct = mst + (1  )wt
=

+ 
1   +

1  

yt +

 (1  )
(1  )   
 (+ )
1  

kt   
(1  )  kt+1: (49)
Analogous to the model with government debt, equation (48) shows that movements in
mct and mct+1 are highly substitutable in terms of their e¤ect on t and that, for any initial
value of ination, there are multiple paths for mct that will return ination to target. As
earlier, these di¤erent paths for real marginal costs are associated with di¤erent monetary
policies and with di¤erent performance in terms of loss. Equation (49) shows that monetary
policy can a¤ect mct through two distinct channels. To lower real marginal costs, the central
bank can either raise the real interest rate, weakening aggregate demand and thereby causing
yt to decline or it can lower the real interest rate to stimulate investment and thereby boost
the future capital stock. Notice that raising (lowering) the real interest rate causes both
yt and kt+1 to decline (rise) and that yt and kt+1 have countervailing e¤ects on mct. As a
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consequence, the desirability of each policy from the perspective of the period-t policymaker
turns on how future policymakers are expected to respond to the capital stock.
Consider the case where future policymakers are expected to lower the interest rate in
response to a rise in the capital stock. Following a positive markup shock, the policy of
raising the real interest rate and causing yt and kt+1 to decline will successfully deliver lower
real marginal costs and ination because the boost in future real marginal costs caused by the
decline in the capital stock is o¤set by higher interest rates in the future. Under this approach,
monetary policy responds to the positive markup shock by contracting demand, lowering real
marginal costs and ination, and by then lowering interest rates as ination declines allowing
the economy to recover, producing equilibrium C (or B). Alternatively, if future policymakers
are expected to raise the interest rate in response to a higher capital stock, then a policy that
lowers the real interest rate and stimulates investment can bring about a decline in ination,
despite the boost to yt and mct today, because future policymakers respond to the higher
capital stock by tightening monetary policy, producing equilibrium A.
The economys behavior in the di¤erent equilibria are shown in Figure 2 which displays
the responses of key variables to a unit markup shock.
Focusing rst on equilibria B and C, following the markup shock the interest rate is raised
(Panel I) by more than the increase in ination (Panel F), causing the real interest rate to
rise. The higher real interest rate generates a decline in consumption (Panel D) and investment
(Panel G), which lowers output (Panel A) and real marginal costs (Panels E and H). Further,
the fall in investment leads to a decline in the capital stock (Panel B). In subsequent periods,
the decline in real marginal costs causes ination to moderate. With ination declining back to
baseline, monetary policy responds by lowering the interest rate and stimulating demand. In
these two equilibria, monetary policy stabilizes the economy in the traditional way, contracting
output and hence real marginal costs in order to keep inationary pressures contained.
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Figure 2: Responses to unit markup shock
In contrast, in equilibrium A the interest rate is lowered in response to the positive markup
shock, generating a big decline in the real interest rate. The lower real interest rate stimulates
consumption and investment, which pushes up output and real marginal costs and further
boosts ination. However, the rise in investment causes the capital stock to increase and the
capital build up eventually lowers real marginal costs while inducing tighter monetary policy.
Although the policy tightening is aimed primarily at lowering investment, it also serves to
lower output, which causes a further decline in real marginal costs. In this equilibrium,
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monetary policy responds to the markup shock by stimulating the economy in order to boost
capital spending. This policy succeeds in stabilizing the economy because the higher capital
stock causes future real marginal costs to decline and future monetary policy to tighten.
Clearly the economy behaves very di¤erently in equilibrium A than it does in equilibrium
B. But is the conventional policy associated with equilibria B and C superior to the un-
conventional policy associated with equilibrium A and should we expect one equilibrium to
prevail over the other? To answer these questions we apply the equilibrium selection methods
described in Section 3 and report the results in Table 4. As earlier, to analyze whether the
equilibria are -proper, we perturb the model in respect to the information set that private
agents use to form expected future aggregate ination, see equation (47).
Table 4: Equilibrium characteristics
Equilibrium
Characteristic A B C
(1) Average loss 6:5921 0:7653 0:2436
(2) IE-stable (Joint) yes no yes
(3) IE-stable (Private sector) yes yes yes
(4) Self-enforceable no no yes
(5) Switch to Pareto-preferred (pj + 1) 69 3 
(6) -proper yes no yes
(7) Policy rule implementable no yes yes
(8) Backus-Dri¢ ll yes no yes
(9) Oudiz-Sachs no no yes
It is clear from Table 4 that the conventional policy is superior to the unconventional policy
(row 1). Rows (2) and (3) show that both equilibrium A and equilibrium C are jointly learnable
and learnable by private agents while row (6) shows that these equilibria are both -proper.
However, because the Pareto-preferred equilibrium (equilibrium C) is private-sector learnable,
it follows that equilibria A and B are not self-enforceable. Further, it is notable that the
policy rule associated with the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is implementable. Accordingly,
by conducting policy according to the rule associated with equilibrium C, policymakers can
ensure that equilibrium C prevails. Like the previous model, therefore, the Pareto-preferred
equilibrium is selected as the equilibrium of interest.
5 Conclusion
Discretionary policymakers can manage neither the expectations of private agents nor the
actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, discretionary policymakers are susceptible
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to expectations traps and coordination failures and discretionary control problems can have
multiple equilibria. Recognizing this potential for multiple equilibria, this paper addresses
the important issue of equilibrium selection, an issue related intrinsically to the capacity for
agents to coordinate. One contribution of this paper is to cast the discretionary control
problem as a dynamic game, allowing us to explain clearly the strategic interactions that give
rise to multiple equilibria. However, the papers main contribution is to develop a range of
equilibrium selection criteria, criteria motivated by expectational stability, self-enforceability,
and a notion of properness.
We illustrate these equilibrium selection criteria by applying them to two New Keynesian
models. In the rst model, the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is one of two equilibria that
is both jointly learnable and learnable by private agents. Since, the Pareto-preferred is the
only equilibrium that is self-enforceable and -proper in this model, the equilibrium selection
criteria indicate that agents might plausibly coordinate upon it. In the second model, the
Pareto-preferred equilibrium is one of two equilibrium that is jointly learnable and -proper,
and all equilibria are private sector learnable. Nevertheless, the Pareto-preferred equilib-
rium is selected as the equilibrium of interest because it is self-enforceable and because it is
implementable.
Although these selection criteria happen to point to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium as the
equilibrium of interest in these two models, this need not have been the case. Our experience is
that the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is jointly learnable, but that it is not necessarily private
sector learnable. It is entirely possible, therefore, that in other models these selection criteria
could point toward equilibria (or an equilibrium) that is Pareto-dominated. Finally, while we
have described and applied three selection criteria in this paper, there are, of course, other
approaches to selecting among equilibria. One such approach might be to select an equilibrium
using minimax-loss or minimax-regret; another might be to identify an equilibrium from the
limiting behavior of quasi-commitment policies. We leave the study and application of these
criteria, and an investigation into whether multiple discretionary equilibria is a general feature
of New Keynesian monetary policy models, for future work.
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